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On making the right choice: A meta-analysis and large-scale
replication attempt of the unconscious thought advantage
Mark R. Nieuwenstein∗ Tjardie Wierenga† Richard D. Morey† Jelte M. Wicherts‡
Tesse N. Blom§ Eric-Jan Wagenmakers§ Hedderik van Rijn†
Abstract
Are difficult decisions best made after a momentary diversion of thought? Previous research addressing this important
question has yielded dozens of experiments in which participants were asked to choose the best of several options (e.g.,
cars or apartments) either after conscious deliberation, or after a momentary diversion of thought induced by an unrelated
task. The results of these studies were mixed. Some found that participants who had first performed the unrelated task were
more likely to choose the best option, whereas others found no evidence for this so-called unconscious thought advantage
(UTA). The current study examined two accounts of this inconsistency in previous findings. According to the reliability
account, the UTA does not exist and previous reports of this effect concern nothing but spurious effects obtained with an
unreliable paradigm. In contrast, the moderator account proposes that the UTA is a real effect that occurs only when certain
conditions are met in the choice task. To test these accounts, we conducted a meta-analysis and a large-scale replication
study (N = 399) that met the conditions deemed optimal for replicating the UTA. Consistent with the reliability account,
the large-scale replication study yielded no evidence for the UTA, and the meta-analysis showed that previous reports of
the UTA were confined to underpowered studies that used relatively small sample sizes. Furthermore, the results of the
large-scale study also dispelled the recent suggestion that the UTA might be gender-specific. Accordingly, we conclude
that there exists no reliable support for the claim that a momentary diversion of thought leads to better decision making
than a period of deliberation.
Keywords: unconscious thought, deliberation without attention, decision making, meta-analysis, publication bias, funnel
plot, large-scale replication study, Bayes factor.
1 Introduction
While research on human judgment and decision making
has yielded many findings that suggest that the best way to
make a difficult choice is to think carefully about the op-
tions and their consequences (e.g., Baron, 2008; Kahne-
man, 2011), the theory of unconscious thought (Dijkster-
huis & Nordgren, 2006) proposes that this is not necessar-
ily the best way to make a difficult choice. Rather, this
theory proposes that the best way to make a difficult deci-
sion is to refrain from painstaking conscious deliberation
and to let one’s unconscious mind solve the problem while
one engages in more enjoyable activities such as solving
a cross-word puzzle. More specifically, this theory claims
the existence of an unconscious form of thought that has
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a much greater information-processing capacity than con-
scious thought. As a result, a momentary diversion of at-
tention would benefit making a difficult decision because
it allows the clever unconscious mind to take charge and
solve the problem at hand.
So should decision makers really be told—as they have
been (BBC News, 2006; Hoare, 2012)—to refrain from
conscious deliberation and to rely on their unconscious
minds in making difficult decisions? Research examin-
ing this matter began with seminal studies in which Dijk-
sterhuis and colleagues (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis,
Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006) presented partici-
pants a large number of properties of different choice op-
tions (e.g., cars, candidate roommates, apartments), and
then asked the participants to select the best option either
after a period of conscious deliberation or after perform-
ing an unrelated task. (See Figure 1 for a graphical de-
piction of the paradigm.) Although the statistical analy-
ses reported by Dijksterhuis and colleagues were subop-
timal (e.g., Hasselman, Crielaard, & Bosman, submitted;
Nieuwenstein & Van Rijn, 2012), the results of some of
these experiments did show that participants who had first
performed the unrelated task were more likely to select the
1
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Figure 1: The paradigm that was introduced by Dijksterhuis (2004) to examine the potential benefits of distraction in
complex decision making.
The unconscious thought paradigm
Information acquisition phase
Nabusi has 
good mileage
time
Participants are told that they will receive
information about four different cars and that they
should form an impression of each of the cars.
Then they are shown a series of 48 displays that
describe 12 features for each of 4 cars (e.g.,
“Nabusi has good mileage”). The options differ in
terms of their number of desirable and
undesirable features (e.g., good vs. poor
mileage).
Deliberation phase
Or
Deliberate Distracting Task
W G W X G
U R I X Q
O E M B H
K E S T V
Z N S K A
Target: GREEN
You will later be asked 
for your opinion about 
the cars. You now
have three minutes to 
think carefully about 
the cars. 
Participants are randomly assigned to a
deliberation or distraction condition. Participants
in each group are told that they will later be
asked for their opinion about the cars. The
deliberation group then gets three minutes to
think carefully about the cars. The distraction
group performs an unrelated task (e.g., a
word-search puzzle) for the same period of time.
Decision phase
If you would have to choose one of these cars, which one would you choose?
A. Hatsdun B. Kaiwa C. Dasuka D. Nabusi
best option than participants who were given the opportu-
nity to deliberate—a phenomenon termed the unconscious
thought advantage (UTA; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis
et al., 2006; see also Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). Fol-
lowing these reports, many other researchers attempted to
replicate the finding of an UTA (e.g., Acker, 2008, who
reviewed results available in 2008) and the results of these
replication attempts were mixed, as they were split almost
evenly between studies that did and did not find evidence
for the UTA. (For a recent overview, see Nieuwenstein &
van Rijn, 2012.)
2 The current study
In the current study, we contrast two explanations for
the inconsistent results of previous studies examining the
UTA. According to the reliability account, the UTA does
not exist and previous reports of this effect concern noth-
ing but spurious differences obtained from an unreliable
paradigm. In contrast, the moderator account proposes
that the UTA is real but observed only when specific con-
ditions are met in the choice task. In the following sec-
tions, we first elaborate on the argumentation underlying
these accounts before turning to the approach we took to
adjudicate between them.
2.1 The reliability account
The reliability account was already hinted at in one of
the early studies that failed to replicate the UTA. In this
study, Acker (2008) conducted a meta-analysis on 17 ex-
periments that were available at that time. The analy-
sis showed that only five of these experiments reported a
statistically significant UTA effect. Furthermore, Acker
found that these experiments had “the largest effect sizes
but at the same time the smallest sample sizes” (p. 299;
Acker, 2008), thus raising the possibility that the results
found in these studies concerned spurious effects (see also
Bakker, Van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Newell & Rakow,
2011; Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005).
Indeed, the unconscious thought paradigm illustrated in
Figure 1 has three properties that together seem to make
a potent recipe for spurious results, especially with small
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sample sizes. To start, the paradigm involves a complex
task for which performance is likely to depend on a host
of factors that can differ across time and participants, in-
cluding concentration, mindset, gender, motivation, ex-
pertise about the choice at hand, attention and memory.
Secondly, the paradigm uses a between-subjects manipu-
lation of mode of thought with random assignment, mean-
ing that the effect of the distraction vs. deliberation ma-
nipulation is assessed by comparing the performance of
different participants. Thirdly, the performance measure
for the task stems from only a single observation for each
participant, meaning that each participant carries out the
task only once, without practice. Arguably, this combi-
nation of properties makes a potent recipe for spurious
results because the use of random assignment does not
necessarily guarantee an equal distribution of task-relevant
factors across two groups of participants, especially when
the number of such factors is large (Hsu, 1989; Krause &
Howard, 2003), as would seem to be the case in the uncon-
scious thought paradigm. Moreover, the use of a single-
trial design entails that the performance measure derived
for each participant is bound to be an unreliable index of
true, mean performance of that participant. Accordingly,
it seems clear that the reliability and validity of results of
studies examining the UTA hinges critically on whether
these studies used a sample size that was sufficiently large
to balance out the many potential confounding factors in
the comparison of performance in the deliberation and dis-
traction conditions. By implication, it stands to reason that
the small-sample studies that found a statistically signifi-
cant difference in performance in the deliberation and dis-
traction conditions concerned a spurious difference.
2.2 The moderator account
In contrast to the reliability account, the moderator ac-
count proposes that the UTA is a real effect that is ob-
served only when certain conditions are met with regard
to the choice task. This account was proposed in a recent
meta-analysis that was conducted by proponents of the
theory of unconscious thought (Strick, Dijksterhuis, Bos,
Sjoerdsma, & Van Baaren, 2011). The analysis included
a large collection of published and unpublished data sets
and it examined a large number of potential moderators of
the UTA, including seemingly trivial methodological de-
tails such as whether the distracting task involved a word-
search puzzle or an anagram task. The results yielded a
pooled effect size of .218 (CI: .130-.307, p < .01), suggest-
ing that, overall, a benefit of distraction in making com-
plex choices does exist. Furthermore, many of the moder-
ator variables included in the analysis indeed had a signif-
icant effect on the magnitude of this benefit (see Table 1).
Specifically, the effect size of the UTA was found to de-
pend on the complexity of the choice problem, the type of
goal participants were led to adopt during the information
acquisition phase of the task, the manner in which the in-
formation about the choice alternatives was presented, the
duration of the deliberation or distraction phase, and the
nature of the task that was used to divert attention in the
distraction condition. Accordingly, Strick et al. concluded
that the UTA is real but the occurrence of this effect re-
quires that certain conditions be met, as indicated by the
results of the moderator analyses.
3 Outline of the current study
In the current study, we set out to adjudicate between the
reliability and moderator accounts. To this end, we con-
ducted a large-scale replication study that met each of
the conditions found to yield a strong effect in the meta-
analysis by Strick et al. (2011; see Table 1), and we con-
ducted a meta-analysis that moved beyond the analysis by
Strick et al. by examining the relationship between sample
and effect sizes using a funnel-plot (i.e., a plot that depicts
effect sizes against a measure of study precision that is
directly related to sample size, such as the inverse of the
standard error; e.g., Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Meyer,
1997; Light & Pillemer, 1984). According to the reli-
ability account, previous findings of a significant benefit
of distraction concern nothing but a spurious result, and,
therefore, these findings would be expected to be confined
to studies that used relatively small sample sizes because
the probability of a spurious effect should decrease with
increasing sample size. Furthermore, the reliability ac-
count also predicts that our large-scale replication study
should show no significant UTA, in spite of the fact that
the design of this study adhered to the recommendations
provided by Strick et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis. In con-
trast, the moderator account would predict that the UTA
should also be observed in studies that used a relatively
large sample size, provided that they met the conditions
under which the UTA is expected to occur (Strick et al.,
2011). Thus, according to the moderator account, our
large-scale replication study would also be predicted to re-
veal the UTA.
4 The large-scale replication study1
The starting point for the large-scale replication study was
a recent study in which Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn (2012)
conducted a first test of the moderator account and found
a number of results that warranted further empirical con-
firmation. In this earlier study, Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn
1In this article, we report all measures, conditions, data exclusions,
and the factors underlying the determination of sample size for new re-
sults.
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Table 1: Moderators of the UTA identified in the meta-analysis by Strick, Dijksterhuis, Bos, Sjoerdsma, & Van Baaren
(2011), and the manner in which these conditions were incorporated in the current large-scale replication attempt (see
also Nieuwenstein & Van Rijn, 2012).
Factor Description Current study
Mindset The UTA is larger when participants are led to adopt a configural mindset during
the information acquisition phase. This entails that they should be instructed to
form a global impression of the options.
√
Pictorial in-
formation
The UTA is larger when verbal and pictorial information are combined in present-
ing the options during the information acquisition phase.
√
Presentation
format
The UTA is larger when the information about the choice options is presented
grouped per option, as opposed to in a random order.
√
Complexity The UTA is larger for more complex decision problems. Complexity was defined
by Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) as the total number of attributes involved
in a choice. Choices involving 4 options with 4 attributes are considered to be
simple while choices involving 3 or more options with 10 or more attributes are
considered to be complex.
√
(4x12)
Presentation
time
The UTA is larger when the attributes of the options are presented for a relatively
short duration. The range of presentation times used in previously published stud-
ies is 2–14 seconds.
√
(2.5 sec)
Goal The UTA is larger when participants are told that they will later need to make a
decision or judgment about the options at hand.
√
Distracting
task
The UTA is larger in studies that used a word-search puzzle (as opposed to an
anagram or n-back task) as the distracting task during the UT period.
√
Duration
deliberation
phase
The UTA is larger when the duration of the deliberation phase is relatively short.
The range of durations used in previous studies is 3–8 minutes.
√
(3 min.
or self-paced)
used a task that met the conditions under which the UTA
should be strong according to Strick et al. (2011), with
the contrast between deliberation and distraction imple-
mented as a within-subjects design so as to preclude the
possibility that any observed UTA could be due to a spu-
rious between-group difference. The results of four such
experiments did not yield a statistically significant UTA
effect, suggesting that even when all the moderator con-
ditions identified by Strick et al. are met, the UTA is ei-
ther small or does not occur at all. Importantly, however,
these experiments used a relatively small sample size (24-
48 participants), and the experiment that used the largest
sample size (N = 48) did show a non-significant differ-
ence in the direction of the UTA. Furthermore, the results
also suggested that perhaps the UTA is gender-specific,
as a post-hoc exploratory analysis across all four experi-
ments yielded a significant interaction of mode of thought
and gender, with male participants showing a statistically
significant conscious thought advantage while female par-
ticipants showed a non-significant trend towards an UTA.
Lastly, the results of these experiments also suggested that
insofar as the UTA indeed exists, it might occur only when
the duration of the deliberation phase in the conscious de-
liberation condition is fixed at several minutes. Specifi-
cally, the results showed that participants needed only 30
seconds to deliberate about their choice, and they also pro-
vided evidence to suggest that performance in the con-
scious deliberation condition is better when the deliber-
ation phase is self-paced, as opposed to fixed and unnec-
essarily long (see also, Payne, Samper, Bettman, & Luce,
2008).
Given the concerns about the reliability of results ob-
tained in the unconscious thought paradigm, and given
the post-hoc nature of the exploratory analyses that sug-
gested that the UTA might be gender-specific, it is clear
that the results reported by Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn
(2012) warrant a more powerful test with a larger group of
participants. To this end, the current study replicated the
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first experiment in Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn—i.e., the
one that showed a non-significant difference in the direc-
tion of the UTA—with a sample of participants that was
nearly an order of magnitude larger (N = 399) than the
sample used by Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn, thus offering
a much more powerful test of the UTA2 and the potential
moderating role of gender. Furthermore, this large-scale
replication attempt also used a within-subjects design for
the comparison of the deliberation and distraction condi-
tions, with the order of these conditions counterbalanced
across participants. In addition, the experiment included
two versions of the deliberation condition that differed in
whether the duration of the deliberation phase was fixed or
self-paced, thus allowing us to verify if performance in the
deliberation condition—and perhaps the occurrence of the
UTA—indeed depends on the duration of the deliberation
phase. The duration of the deliberation phase was varied
between subjects, and we used two different choice sets
for the two choices that were to be made by each partici-
pant (i.e., a choice between four cars or four apartments),
with a random distribution of these choice sets across the
two choice conditions.
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Participants
The study was conducted as part of a test session at the
University of Amsterdam3 in which all first-year under-
graduates in Psychology could participate on a voluntary
basis to obtain course credit. The number of students
who took part in the study was 423 and this sample in-
cluded 24 non-native speakers of Dutch, whose data were
excluded from analysis. Exclusion of these participants
did not change the results. The remaining 399 participants
were 19.7 years old on average (SD = 1.86 years), and they
included 130 males.
4.1.2 Materials
The experiment was conducted on a computer, using a
program written in Adobe Authorware. The experiment
comprised two choice tasks and a word-search task. The
word-search puzzle task was used to distract participants
during the unconscious deliberation phase.
2It is worth noting that, if the effect size of the UTA is 0.218, as sug-
gested by the meta-analysis by Strick et al. (2011), then one needs a sam-
ple size of 175 participants to acquire a power of .8 in a within-subjects
comparison, or a sample size of 548 for a between-subjects compari-
son. These estimates are based on a power computation for a one-tailed
Wilcoxon signed ranks test for two proportions. Computation was done
using G-power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), retrieved from
http://www.psycho.uni-duesseldorf.de/abteilungen/aap/gpower3/.
3The seminal studies by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (Dijksterhuis,
2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) were also conducted with undergraduates
of the University of Amsterdam.
For each of the choice tasks, participants received infor-
mation about four options—cars or apartments—that were
described in terms of twelve properties that could be de-
sirable or undesirable.4 The quality of the options was de-
fined in terms of their number of desirable properties, such
that the best option had 9 desirable properties whereas two
intermediate options each had 6 desirable properties, and
the worst option had only 3 desirable properties. During
the information acquisition phase, these properties were
presented one after the other in a series of timed displays
that each included the fictitious name of the option, a sen-
tence describing a property of the option, and a picture
of the choice option. The pictures depicted real cars and
apartment buildings (see also Nieuwenstein & Van Rijn,
2012). The word-search puzzle task comprised a 10x10 ar-
ray of letters that was shown together with a target word.
The letters were indexed by the numbers 1–100 and the
task for the participants was to find the target word and
type in the numbers that corresponded to the first and last
letter of the word. The target words denoted countries,
vegetables, or fruits, and could be written in the array in
any direction.
4.1.3 Procedure
At the start of the study, the participants practiced the
word-search puzzle task they would later be asked to do
again during the unconscious deliberation phase. After
practicing this task for one minute, the participants were
informed that they would now see a presentation about
four [cars/apartments] that would each be described in
terms of different properties. In accordance with the rec-
ommendations by Strick et al. (2011), participants were
instructed that they should form a good impression of each
of these options. They were then shown a sequence of
48 displays of the options and their properties. The prop-
erties were presented grouped by option and the twelve
properties were presented in the same order for each of
the four options. The duration of each display was set at
2.5 seconds. In the distraction condition, this information
acquisition phase was followed by an instruction telling
the participants that they would later be asked for their
opinion about the options and that they would first have to
do the word-search puzzle task for a period of three min-
utes. In the deliberation conditions, participants were also
told that they would later be asked for their opinion about
the options, and they were instructed that they would first
get three minutes (fixed deliberation phase) or as long as
they needed (self-paced deliberation phase) to think care-
fully about the options. During this period, the pictures
and names of the options remained in view, together with
4These stimuli were also used in the first two studies that found ev-
idence for the UTA (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; for a
detailed description of the stimuli, see Nieuwenstein & Van Rijn, 2012).
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 2015 Unconscious thought meta-analysis 6
Table 2: Number of participants (N) included in each of
the four versions of the task.
Order of choice conditions
Duration conscious
deliberation phase
N
Deliberation—Distraction Fixed 99
Distraction—Deliberation Fixed 103
Deliberation—Distraction Self-paced 97
Distraction—Deliberation Self-paced 100
a counter that indicated the passage of time in seconds.
In the self-paced deliberation condition, the same display
was shown but now participants could press a designated
key once they had made up their mind. At this point, par-
ticipants received the instruction to select the best option
by pressing a corresponding key on the keyboard. In the
fixed deliberation condition, this instruction appeared au-
tomatically after three minutes had passed. After selecting
the best option, participants were asked to indicate on a
10-pt. scale how confident they were about their choice.
In addition, participants in the deliberation condition with
a fixed 3-minute deliberation phase were asked to estimate
how long they had needed to arrive at a decision. For par-
ticipants in the self-paced deliberation condition, the pro-
gram registered how long it took before they indicated they
had made up their mind.
4.1.4 Design
Each participant made one choice after conscious deliber-
ation and one choice after doing the word-search task, and
the order of these conditions was counterbalanced across
participants. For half the participants, the duration of the
deliberation phase in the conscious deliberation condition
was fixed at 3 minutes and it was self-paced for the other
participants. The duration of the word-search task that was
used to induce a diversion of thought in the distraction
condition was three minutes for all participants. The two
orders of the deliberation and distraction conditions and
the two durations of the deliberation phase were crossed to
create four different versions of the task, and participants
were randomly assigned to one of these four versions (see
Table 2). The two choice sets (cars and apartments) were
randomly assigned to the deliberation and distraction con-
ditions, yielding a balanced design of within and between-
subject factors.
4.1.5 Data-analysis
The plan for data-analysis was to examine accuracy on the
choice task for main effects and interactions of mode of
thought (deliberation vs. distraction), gender (male vs. fe-
male), and the duration of the deliberation phase in the
deliberation condition (fixed vs. self-paced). Choice accu-
racy was defined in terms of whether a participant selected
the option with the greatest number of desirable proper-
ties, as is typically done in this paradigm. Since this out-
come has a binomial distribution, the data were modelled
using a logit function and analyzed using a generalized lin-
ear model (GLM). The effects that were tested using the
GLM were estimated using generalized estimating equa-
tions so as to allow for the possibility that the observa-
tions could be correlated across the within-subjects factor
of mode of thought. The confidence ratings were treated
as an ordinal variable and analyzed for the same effects
using a GLM.
4.2 Results
As a first step in analyzing the data, we examined how
long participants needed to deliberate about their choice
in the fixed and self-paced conscious thought conditions,
and we examined if choice accuracy in this condition de-
pended on whether the duration of the deliberation phase
was self-paced or fixed at three minutes. The analysis of
deliberation time showed that on average, participants in
the self-paced condition took only 23 seconds to deliber-
ate (SD = 19.4, 95% CI = [20.5; 26.1]). In addition, this
analysis showed that there was no significant relationship
between choice accuracy and deliberation time, with the
mean deliberation times being 25.0 (SD = 25.4 , 95% CI
= [20.0; 30.7]) and 21.7 seconds (SD = 13.1, 95% CI =
[13.5; 24.4]), respectively, for participants who made an
incorrect or correct choice (t[195] = 1.17, p = .24, Co-
hen’s d = .17). A similar result was found for participants
for whom the duration of the deliberation phase was fixed
at three minutes. To be precise, these participants reported
that they had needed 37 seconds (SD = 31.0, 95% CI =
[32.7; 41.4]) on average to deliberate, and for these par-
ticipants too, self-reported deliberation time did not dif-
fer between participants who made a correct or incorrect
choice, M = 37.7 (SD = 30.1, 95% CI = [31.3; 44.3])
vs. M = 37.1 (SD = 31.8, 95% CI = [ 32.1; 42.7]) sec-
onds respectively, t(200) = .15, p = .88, Cohen’s d = 0.02.
Lastly, a comparison of choice accuracy in the deliberation
conditions with a self-paced and fixed deliberation phase
showed no significant effect of the duration of the deliber-
ation phase, with the percentage of correct choices being
59.4 and 56.9%, respectively, for the fixed and self-paced
conditions, Z = .52, p = .61.
The main analysis of interest examined choice accuracy
for effects of mode of thought and gender. As can be seen
in Tables 3A and 3B, there were no significant effects in-
volving mode of thought, with the percentage of correct
choices being 58.2% and 61.9%, respectively, in the de-
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Table 3: A. Percentage of participants who chose the op-
tion with the largest number of desirable properties in in
the deliberation and distraction conditions, shown sepa-
rately for male and female participants.
Condition Gender N
Choice Accuracy
(% correct)
Deliberation Male 130 50.8
Female 269 61.7
Distraction Male 130 55.4
Female 269 65.1
B. Outcomes of general linear model examining effects of
mode of thought (deliberation vs. distraction) and gender
on choice accuracy.
Source Wald χ2 (df =1) p-value
Intercept 20.56 <.001
Mode of thought 1.09 .30
Gender 8.24 <.01
Mode of thought * Gender .02 .90
liberation and distraction conditions.5 The sole effect to
reach significance was the main effect of gender, with fe-
male participants being significantly more likely to select
the best option than male participants (63% vs. 53%, re-
spectively). Crucially, however, gender did not interact
with mode of thought, thus failing to replicate the inter-
action effect that was found in an exploratory analysis by
Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn (2012). Lastly, the analysis
of the confidence ratings did not show significant effects
of mode of thought or of the duration of the deliberation
phase, whereas it did yield a significant effect of gender,
χ
2(1) = 13.27, p < .001, with female participants being
less confident about their choice than male participants (M
= 6.9 vs. M = 7.4, respectively).
4.3 Bayes factor analysis
Though the results of the GLM analysis are clear in
demonstrating a lack of a statistically significant UTA,
this type of analysis does not allow for a quantification of
the extent to which the results support the null hypothesis
over an alternative hypothesis that stipulates that the effect
does exist. One approach that offers an elegant means to
do so is the computation of a Bayes factor (e.g., Dienes,
2008; Dienes, 2011; Jeffreys, 1961; Morey & Rouder,
5Assuming an effect size d = .218, as found by Strick et al. (2011)
in their meta-analysis, the power for the statistical test of this within-
subjects difference between the deliberation and distraction conditions
was .997.
2011; Newell & Rakow, 2011; Rouder, Speckman, Sun,
Morey, & Iverson, 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007). To be pre-
cise, a Bayes factor can be used to competitively contrast
two models of the data, which in this case represent the
null hypothesis (H0) that there exists no UTA effect and
an alternative hypothesis (H1), which assumes that this ef-
fect does exist. The Bayes factor is the relative likelihood
of the data under these two hypotheses, and the outcome
of this computation indicates the extent to which rational
observers should adjust their relative beliefs in response
to the data. Specifically, if the Bayes factor is greater than
one, it indicates that belief should be adjusted in favor of
the null hypothesis, and if it is less than one, it indicates
that belief should be adjusted in favor of the alternative
hypothesis.
To competitively contrast the H0 and H1 models, we
first had to construct a model for H1 which was intended
to fairly represent the outcome a proponent of the UTA
would predict for the current study. To construct the
model, we used the outcomes of six experiments that were
conducted by proponents of the UTA, and that were re-
ported to show a significant UTA (Experiment 2 in Dijk-
sterhuis [2004], Experiment 1 in Dijksterhuis et al. [2006],
Experiments 1 and 2 in Nordgren, Bos, & Dijksterhuis
[2011], and Experiments 1 and 2 in Strick, Dijksterhuis,
& Van Baaren [2010]). The reasons for using these exper-
iments as the basis for the H1 model were that they were
all reported to show evidence in favor of the UTA (even
though not all these effects were statistically significant,
see the Supplement), and because they were similar to the
current study in terms of their outcome measure (propor-
tion of correct choices). The reason why we chose to use
only studies that reported proportions correct—as opposed
to using all studies done by proponents of the UTA—was
that this enabled us to use the same scale to model the data
from our own study and from the studies we used to con-
struct the H1 prior.
Taken together, the six experiments used as a basis for
the H1 prior included 150 participants in the distraction
condition and 172 participants in the deliberation condi-
tion and the proportions of correct choices in these con-
ditions were .62 and .31, respectively. On the basis of
these data, we developed a model for H1 (see Supplement
for details) which can be argued to reflect the prediction
a proponent of the UTA would make for the current ex-
periment, according to their own observations. Indeed, it
could even be argued that our estimate of this prediction
underestimates the effect a proponent of the UTA would
predict for the current study, as the 6 studies used for de-
riving this predicted outcome did not all meet all of the re-
quirements for a strong UTA effect, as suggested by Strick
et al. (2011) in their meta-analysis. Thus, to the extent that
one believes the UTA is stronger if the recommendations
of Strick et al. are followed, one should also believe that
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Table 4: Results for a between-subject comparison of per-
formance in the condition that was done first by each par-
ticipant in the current study.
Condition N Choice accuracy (% correct)
Deliberation 196 55.61
Distraction 203 55.17
Figure 2: Graphical depiction of the probability density
functions for the effect size of the UTA predicted under
H1 (the prior, depicted as a dashed line), and the posterior
probability density function after inclusion of the outcome
of the current study (the solid line). Effect size is defined
in probit units.
the outcome we derived as a prediction for the H1 prior
underestimates the magnitude of the UTA that proponents
would predict for our experiment, which met all recom-
mendations of Strick et al.
In computing the Bayes factor, we assumed that the pro-
portions of correct choices in the deliberation and distrac-
tion conditions were binomially distributed, and the pa-
rameters of these distributions were derived from a stan-
dard probit model. By applying this probit model to the 6
previous studies showing the UTA, we derived a distribu-
tion of a priori expectations for the true effect size under
H1 (depicted by the dashed line in Figure 2). For the cur-
rent study, we followed a similar procedure to model the
results for the between-subjects comparison of the deliber-
ation and distraction conditions, using only the outcomes
for the condition that was done first by each participant6
6The reason for using this between-subject comparison was that it
was equivalent to the between-subject comparisons reported in the six
experiments that formed the basis for the H1-model. To compute the
statistical power of this comparison, we used the meta-analytic effect
size computed for the six studies that were used for constructing the H1-
model. Given this effect size of d = .69, the power for our between-
subjects comparison was .999.
(see Table 4). The Bayes factor was then computed as the
extent by which the density around the null hypothesis d =
0 grew from the prior for H1 to the posterior after includ-
ing the data from our large-scale study. As can be seen
in Figure 2, the null effect of our study caused the pos-
terior distribution to gather around the null value d = 0.
Specifically, the density at d = 0 grew by a factor of 7.83,
meaning that a rational observer who considers H1 against
H0 should adjust his belief in favor of H0 by a factor of
7.83.7
5 Meta-analysis
Taken together, the results of the large-scale replication
study provide compelling evidence against the moderator
account, as they make clear that a high-powered study that
is optimized in accordance with the purported moderators
of the UTA yields no evidence for this effect. By impli-
cation, the results of the large-scale replication study may
also be considered as support for the reliability account.
As described in the introduction, this account not only pre-
dicts that the UTA will not be found in a large-scale study
but it also predicts that previous studies that did show this
effect should be confined to studies that were unreliable
due to the use of small sample sizes.
To test this prediction, we examined the relationship
between effect and sample sizes for a data set that in-
cluded both our large-scale study and all previously pub-
lished experiments that compared the accuracy of diffi-
cult choices made after distraction or deliberation. Specif-
ically, we collected data from all published studies that
used the same type of multi-attribute choice task, and the
same types of deliberation and distraction conditions as
Dijksterhuis and colleagues used in their seminal studies
from 2004 and 2006 (see Figure 1 for a depiction of the
task), and which have since then been used in dozens of
replication attempts. (See Table 6 for a list of these stud-
ies and their effect and sample sizes.) Based on these data,
we constructed a so-called funnel plot in which the effect
sizes were plotted against a measure of study precision
directly related to sample size, namely the inverse of the
standard error (Egger et al., 1997; see also, Bakker et al.,
2012; Light & Pillemer, 1984). Of particular relevance to
the present study, this type of plot allows one to mark re-
gions of statistical (non)significance, as the significance of
a standardized mean difference score is a function of the
7The value of the Bayes factor would decrease if one were to assume
that the effect is smaller than our estimate of the effect that would be
predicted by proponents of the UTA, and it would increase if one as-
sumes that the effect is larger. To see how the Bayes factor varies across
different values of the H1-prior, we devised an interactive applet which
allows for the computation of the Bayes factor for a comparison of pro-
portions, with different values for the H1-prior: http://glimmer.rstudio.
com/rdmorey/bfProportions.
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score and its standard error. Thus, a funnel plot allows the
viewer to gauge in a single glance both the distribution of
significant and non-significant effects, as well as the rela-
tionship between these effects and their reliability, defined
in terms of standard error. Accordingly, by inspection of
the funnel plot, one can determine if previous reports of a
significant UTA are indeed confined to studies that were
relatively unreliable due to the use of small sample sizes,
as predicted by the reliability account.
Aside from using a funnel plot to examine the relation-
ship between effect and sample sizes, we subjected the
data set to a quantitative meta-analysis in which we com-
puted the overall effect size, and analyzed and corrected
the data set for the existence of publication bias, using pro-
cedures described in detail in the following sections.
5.1 Data collection and study inclusion cri-
teria
Studies comparing the effects of distraction and delibera-
tion on human judgment and decision making were iden-
tified through searching the Web of Science database with
“unconscious thought” and “deliberation without atten-
tion” as keywords. In addition, we checked all citations
of the two seminal studies by Dijksterhuis and colleagues
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), and we
cross-checked the studies we found against the set of stud-
ies included in the meta-analysis by Strick et al. (2011).
All together, this search yielded a set of 54 published re-
search articles that reported a total of 129 unique compar-
isons of the effects of distraction and deliberation on some
measure of judgment or choice accuracy (see Table 5 for
a general description of these studies; see the Supplement
for a table listing all studies found).
As can be seen in Table 5, the majority of published
studies that have compared the effects of distraction and
deliberation on judgment and decision making have used
a multi-attribute choice task similar to that used in the cur-
rent large-scale replication attempt. Specifically, of the
54 research articles we found, 33 included one or more
studies comparing the effects of distraction and deliber-
ation on a multi-attribute choice task, and these articles
together reported a total of 81 such studies (63% of all
studies). In comparison, the next largest set of studies—
those examining the effects of deliberation and distraction
on creativity—included only 13 studies that were reported
in 5 research articles. Since our main goal for the meta-
analysis was to investigate the relationship between sam-
ple and effect sizes, we chose to restrict our analysis to
studies using a multi-attribute choice task as these studies
constituted the large majority of all studies, and because
the use of the same type of task entailed that they could
all be assumed to measure the same effect. Studies exam-
ining the effects of deliberation and distraction on multi-
attritube choice tasks were included in the meta-analysis
if they met the following three inclusion criteria:
1. The study should include sufficient information to
compute Hedges g, a measure of the standardized
mean difference between conditions. This criterion
led to the exclusion of one study.
2. The instructions given to the participants had to be
similar to the instructions used by Dijksterhuis and
colleagues in their seminal studies from 2004 and
2006. This meant that participants should have been
instructed to form an impression of the options dur-
ing the information acquisition phase (as opposed to
being instructed to memorize the information about
the options) and that they should have been informed
prior to the distraction task that they would later be
asked to judge or choose amongst the options. This
criterion led to the exclusion of 7 studies that each
used an instruction to memorize the information dur-
ing the information acquisition phase.
3. The choice problem used in the multi-attribute choice
task should have been complex, as the UTA is only
predicted to occur for complex choices. The com-
plexity of a multi-attribute choice task can be defined
in terms of the number of options multiplied by the
number of attributes used to describe these options.
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) did not propose a
criterion for when a multi-attribute choice should be
considered to be complex, but the studies by Dijkster-
huis and colleagues make clear that choices involv-
ing a total of 16 attributes are considered as simple,
and therefore unlikely to produce the UTA, whereas
choices involving a total of 30 or more attributes were
predicted to yield an UTA, and may thus be consid-
ered to be complex. Accordingly, we included only
studies with a total of at least 30 attributes, result-
ing in the exclusion of 4 studies that each used a
multi-attribute choice task with four options defined
by only four attributes.
5.2 Data set and effect size computation
After exclusion of the twelve multi-attribute choice stud-
ies that did not meet our inclusion criteria, we had a total
69 studies remaining in our data set. As a subsequent step,
we computed composite effect sizes for 7 studies that re-
ported two separate comparisons for two groups of partic-
ipants. To be precise, we computed composite effect sizes
for studies that compared a distraction and deliberation
condition separately for two groups of participants that
differed in having been primed to obtain a feeling of high
or low power (Experiments 1 and 2 in Smith, Dijkster-
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Table 5: Brief description of the types of studies found in search for studies comparing the effects of deliberation and
distraction on judgment and decision making. N = number of research articles that reported studies in one or more
domains, K = total number of studies within a particular domain. References and further details for all studies are
provided in the Supplement.
Domain N K Task description
Multi-attribute
choice
33 81 Presentation of attributes of several choice options, followed by deliberation or distrac-
tion, followed by a rating or choice of the options.
Creativity 5 13 Probe for remote associates test (K = 4) or idea generation task (K = 9), followed by
deliberation or distraction, followed by providing the answers to the task.
Post-choice
satisfaction
5 8 Product chosen after deliberation or distraction, measurement of post-choice satisfac-
tion 1-5 weeks after choice was made.
Moral judgment 4 7 Presentation of moral dilemma (K = 3) / a description of a job application procedure
that varied in terms of fairness (K = 4), followed by deliberation or distraction, followed
by judgment of what do to in the dilemma / a judgment of whether the application
procedure was fair.
Lie detection 1 5 Presentation of a movie clip in which someone could be lying or telling the truth, fol-
lowed by deliberation or distraction, followed by judgment of whether the person was
lying or telling the truth.
Legal judgment 1 4 Presentation of legal case, followed by deliberation or distraction, followed by a judg-
ment of whether the defendant is guilty.
Clinical diagnosis 3 3 Presentation of complex medical case followed by deliberation or distraction, followed
by judgment of life expectancy or diagnosis.
Prediction 1 2 Presentation of forthcoming soccer games, followed by deliberation or distraction, fol-
lowed by prediction of outcomes of the games.
Thought intrusions 2 2 Presentation of negative movie, followed by deliberation or distraction, followed by
measurement of thought intrusions.
Stereotyping 1 2 Activation of stereotype, followed by presentation of behavioral descriptions of a per-
son, followed by deliberation or distraction, followed by judgment of the person in
terms of traits related or unrelated to the stereotype.
Persuasion 1 1 Presentation of persuasive message, followed by deliberation or distraction, followed
by measurement of attitude towards the topic of the presentation.
Artificial grammar 1 1 Presentation of rules of artificial grammar, followed by deliberation or distraction, fol-
lowed by evaluation of artificial grammar in new items.
huis, & Wigboldus, 2008), the consumption of a can of 7-
Up (Bos, Dijksterhuis, & Van Baaren, 2012), low vs. high
need for cognition (Experiment 2 in Lassiter, Lindberg,
Gonzalez-Vallejo, Belleza, & Phillips, 2009), or featural
vs. configural mindset (Experiments 2 and 3 in Lerouge,
2009). The reason for aggregating the results across these
between-subjects factors was that these factors could be
expected to vary naturally across participants in the other
studies. Lastly, we also computed composite effect sizes
for two studies in which the information about the options
was presented in two different formats (numerical scores
vs. colour-defined scores and numerical scores vs. star-
count scores; Abadie, Villejoubert, Waroquier, & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2013a). As a result of computing these com-
posite effect sizes, our data set was reduced to a total of
61 unique effect sizes (see Table 6 for the studies and their
effect sizes). The computation of effect sizes was done
using the compute.es function in R, and the meta-analysis
was done using Viechtbauer’s (2010) metafor package.
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Table 6: Effect and sample sizes of the studies included in the meta-analysis. Note that the effect sizes derived from the study by Nieuwenstein and
Van Rijn (2012) were based on the outcome of between-subjects comparisons of the condition done first in experiments that used a within-subjects
design in which each participant made one or more choices after deliberation or distraction.
Study (experiment, year) N CT N UT Total N Hedges’ g SE Hedges’ g
Abadie et al. (E1, 2013a) 72 72 144 −0.37 0.19
Abadie et al. (E2, 2013a) 79 79 158 −0.62 0.20
Abadie et al. (E2, 2013b) 20 40 60 0.22 0.30
Acker (E1, 2008) 32 34 66 −0.47 0.25
Aczel et al. (E1, 2011) 24 24 48 −0.35 0.29
Ashby et al. (E1, 2011) 20 21 41 0.93 0.33
Ashby et al. (E2, 2011) 26 27 53 1.00 0.29
Ashby et al. (E3, 2011) 18 18 36 −0.21 0.34
Bos et al. (E1a, 2008) 16 16 32 1.48 0.41
Bos et al. (E1, 2012) 82 74 156 −0.10 0.16
Calvillo & Penaloza (E1, 2009) 20 20 40 −0.28 0.32
Calvillo & Penaloza (E2a, 2009) 20 20 40 −0.09 0.32
Calvillo & Penaloza (E2b, 2009) 20 20 40 −0.09 0.32
Dijksterhuis (E1, 2004) 17 22 39 0.42 0.33
Dijksterhuis (E2, 2004) 30 30 60 0.46 0.26
Dijksterhuis (E3, 2004) 46 51 97 0.24 0.20
Dijksterhuis et al. (E1, 2006) 20 20 40 0.86 0.33
Dijksterhuis et al. (E2, 2006) 15 15 30 0.70 0.38
González Vallejo et al. (E2, 2013) 42 42 84 0.00 0.25
Hasford (2014) 27 25 52 0.43 0.32
Hess et al. (E1, 2012) 81 81 162 −0.14 0.16
Huizenga et al. (E1, 2011) 30 90 120 −0.26 0.21
Huizenga et al. (E2, 2011) 37 41 78 −0.50 0.23
Huizenga et al. (E4, 2011) 25 50 75 −0.33 0.25
Lassiter et al. (E1, 2009) 21 21 42 0.51 0.32
Lassiter et al. (E2, 2009) 44 44 88 0.27 0.21
Lerouge (E1, 2009) 42 42 84 0.47 0.22
Lerouge (E2, 2009) 36 36 72 0.38 0.24
McMahon et al. (E1, 2011) 15 44 59 0.62 0.31
McMahon et al. (E2, 2011) 24 48 72 0.67 0.26
Messner et al. (E1, 2011) 20 20 40 0.63 0.33
Newell et al. (E1, 2009) 24 23 47 0.17 0.29
Newell et al. (E2, 2009) 23 23 46 −0.50 0.30
Newell et al. (E3, 2009) 30 30 60 −0.37 0.26
Newell and Rakow (E7, 2011) 20 20 40 −0.32 0.23
Newell and Rakow (E8, 2011) 32 32 64 0.09 0.25
Newell and Rakow (E9, 2011) 32 32 64 0.31 0.25
Newell and Rakow (E10, 2011) 25 25 50 −0.37 0.28
Newell and Rakow (E11, 2011) 30 15 45 −0.05 0.36
Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn (E1, 2012) 24 24 48 0.10 0.32
Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn (E2, 2012) 12 12 24 −0.55 0.45
Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn (E3, 2012) 16 16 32 0.87 0.64
Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn (E4, 2012) 12 12 24 −0.74 0.48
Nieuwenstein et al. (current study) 196 203 399 −0.01 0.10
Nordgren et al. (E1, 2011) 24 27 51 0.27 0.27
Nordgren et al. (E2, 2011) 28 27 55 0.36 0.27
Payne et al. (E1, 2008) 84 83 167 −0.10 0.16
Queen & Hess (E1, 2010) 69 68 137 −0.21 0.17
Rey et al. (E1, 2009) 36 30 66 0.27 0.25
Smith et al. (E1, 2008) 42 39 81 0.32 0.22
Smith et al. (E2, 2008) 85 80 165 0.25 0.16
Strick et al. (E1, 2010) 47 49 96 1.21 0.27
Strick et al. (E2, 2010) 31 31 62 0.58 0.29
Thorsteinson & Withrow (E1, 2009) 19 19 38 0.34 0.33
Thorsteinson & Withrow (E2, 2009) 37 37 74 0.18 0.23
Usher et al. (E1, 2011) 27 25 52 0.78 0.29
Usher et al. (E4, 2011) 14 15 29 1.04 0.40
Waroquier et al. (E1, 2009) 49 49 98 −0.56 0.21
Waroquier et al. (E2, 2009) 16 16 32 −0.09 0.36
Waroquier et al. (E3, 2009) 50 50 100 0.07 0.20
Waroquier et al. (E1, 2010) 49 49 98 0.35 0.20
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5.3 Results
The 61 studies included in our data set had a sample size
that ranged between 40 and 399, and their effect sizes
ranged between −.74 and 1.48 (see Table 6). Based on
these data, we constructed a funnel-plot to visualize the
distribution of significant and non-significant effects, and
their relationship to study precision, defined in terms of
the inverse of the standard error (see Figure 3a). The white
area in the plot marks the region in which effect sizes were
non-significant whereas the grey areas mark the regions in
which effect sizes were significant either in the direction
of a conscious thought advantage (CTA; area on the left,
with Hedges’ g < 0) or an unconscious thought advantage
(UTA; area on the right, with Hedges’ g > 0). As this figure
illustrates within a single glance, the published literature
on the unconscious thought effect in multi-attribute choice
tasks includes predominantly non-significant effects (N =
45), and only 16 statistically significant effects of which
12 were in the direction of the UTA whereas 4 were in op-
posite direction, that is, in the direction of an advantage for
deliberation over distraction. Moreover, the plot shows a
clear relationship between study precision and the finding
of a significant UTA, such that the finding of a significant
UTA appears to be confined to studies that had lower pre-
cision. Indeed, the studies with a relatively high precision
show either a non-significant difference or an advantage
for deliberation. Accordingly, it may be concluded that
the observation of a statistically significant UTA appears
to be confined to studies that were unreliable due to the
use of small sample sizes.
As a subsequent step in our analysis we submitted the
data set to a quantitative meta-analysis to compute the
overall effect size. The analysis used a random effects
model and yielded a pooled effect size of 0.15, with a con-
fidence interval of [0.03; 0.26], a Z-score of 2.54, and p
= 0.01, thus suggesting the existence of a small but sta-
tistically significant UTA. Importantly, however, the dis-
tribution of effect sizes shown in Figure 3a suggests that
this effect may need correction for publication bias, as the
distribution appears to be asymmetrical, with a relatively
large number of low-precision UTA effects, and only few
low-precision effects of equal magnitude in opposite di-
rection. The reason why such asymmetry may hint at a
publication bias is that a theoretical, completely filled-in
funnel would be expected to show a symmetrical distri-
bution of studies around the estimated true, mean effect
size, such that studies of the same level of precision would
be expected to be distributed symmetrically around this
mean. An asymmetrical funnel lacking effects of a partic-
ular magnitude, direction, and precision is therefore often
interpreted to reflect a publication bias against this type of
finding (e.g., Egger et al., 1997).
Figure 3: A. A funnel-plot showing the effect sizes of stud-
ies comparing choice made after distraction and delibera-
tion plotted as a function of the inverse of their standard
error. The grey area marks the area wherein effect sizes
are statistically significant at p < .05 and the dashed line
indicates the pooled effect size, Hedges’ g = .15.
B. A funnel-plot with the same effect sizes as those shown
in Figure 3a (grey symbols), with the addition of the effect
sizes that were filled in using the trim and fill procedure
(open symbols). The dashed line indicates the pooled ef-
fect size after inclusion of the filled-in effect sizes.
Since publication bias constitutes a common problem
in meta-analyses, several procedures have been developed
to deal with it. Some of these procedures focus solely on
statistically significant effects, for instance by using the
distribution of the p-values of these effects as a means
to determine whether the distribution matches what could
be expected if an effect truly existed (Simonsohn, Nel-
son, & Simmons, 2014; see also, Van Assen, Van Aert, &
Wicherts, in press). Other procedures use the distribution
of all effect sizes, thus offering methods compatible with
the current data set, which featured predominantly non-
significant effects (e.g., Duval & Tweedie, 2000; Sterne
& Egger, 2005). A first such procedure that is of rele-
vance for the current purposes regards the possibility to
test whether the asymmetry in a funnel plot is statistically
significant. This can be done by means of a regression
analysis in which study precision is used as a predictor of
effect sizes (Sterne & Egger, 2005). Using such a test, we
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indeed found evidence for significant asymmetry, with Z
= 2.11, and p = .04.8
Aside from methods to compute the statistical signifi-
cance of funnel plot asymmetry, researchers have also de-
veloped methods to correct for this asymmetry. One such
method is the so-called trim-and-fill procedure, which al-
lows one to impute missing effect sizes based on the as-
sumption that effect sizes of equal precision should be dis-
tributed symmetrically around the mean effect size9 (Du-
val & Tweedie, 2000). The results of applying this pro-
cedure to the current data set are shown in Figure 3b,
wherein the open symbols denote the 10 effect sizes that
were filled in to correct for the asymmetry. After this
correction, the overall effect size of the UTA turned non-
significant, with a pooled Hedges’ g = 0.018, a confidence
interval of [−0.10; 0.14], a Z-score of 0.30, and p = 0.77.10
6 Discussion and conclusions
With several dozen published experiments presenting con-
flicting results, the unconscious thought advantage (UTA)
may be considered one of the most controversial phenom-
ena in psychological science today. While proponents of
the UTA have argued that the studies that failed to repli-
cate this effect did not meet certain methodological re-
quirements (Strick et al., 2011), critics have argued that
the effect does not exist and that previous reports of the
UTA concerned nothing but spurious, unreliable findings
(e.g., Acker, 2008; Newell & Rakow, 2011; Nieuwenstein
& Van Rijn, 2012). To adjudicate between these opposing
views, we conducted a large-scale study that adhered to
the conditions deemed optimal for replicating this effect
8Some have raised concern about the use of this type of regression
analysis to diagnose publication bias (e.g., Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007;
Terrin, Schmid, Lau, & Olkin, 2003). Importantly, however, the main
reasons for concern, namely that the test has low power for small data
sets and that the asymmetry of the funnel might reflect true heterogeneity
of effects, do not appear to apply to the current meta-analysis, as this
analysis included a large set of studies that all used the same paradigm
and that should therefore be expected to measure the same, or at least a
very similar effect.
9Simonsohn et al. (2014) show that the trim-and-fill performs poorly
in correcting for publication bias when this bias is based on selective
reporting of significant effects, that is, when there is a publication bias
against non-significant effects. Since the data set in our meta-analysis
comprised predominantly non-significant effects, this concern does not
apply to our analysis.
10The results of the meta-analysis were the same when we did not in-
clude composite effect sizes for the studies by Abadie et al. (2013), Bos
et al. (2012), Lassiter et al. (2009), Smith et al. (2008), and Lerouge
(2009), but instead included the effect sizes for both groups of partici-
pants compared separately in these studies. Specifically, an analysis that
included these effect sizes produced a pooled effect size of 0.14, with a
confidence interval of [0.02; 0.26], a Z-score of 2.32, and p = 0.02. This
analysis also showed evidence for significant funnel plot assymmetry, Z
= 2.24, p = .02, and the effect size of .14 was reduced to a non-significant
effect size of −.01 (95% CI = [−.12; .12], p = .92) after application of
the trim-and-fill procedure.
(Strick et al., 2011), and we conducted a meta-analysis
that examined the relationship between the effect and sam-
ple sizes of previous studies. The results of the large-
scale replication study yielded no evidence for the UTA,
and it also dispelled the recent suggestion from Nieuwen-
stein and Van Rijn (2012) that the UTA might be gender-
specific. Furthermore, the meta-analysis showed that pre-
vious reports of a statistically significant UTA were con-
fined to studies that were relatively unreliable due to the
use of small samples of participants. Accordingly, the re-
sults of the current study lead us to conclude that the claim
that distraction leads to better decision making than de-
liberation in a multi-attribute choice task has no reliable
support.
What is left to be explained then is why the paradigm
shown in Figure 1 yields no difference in the quality of
decisions made after distraction or deliberation. Does that
mean that decision makers are just as well off if they do
not think consciously about their choices (Bargh, 2011)?
The answer to this question depends on whether one be-
lieves that the choices made in the unconscious thought
paradigm truly reflect the outcome of two different modes
of thought. On this matter, the literature on human judg-
ment and decision-making offers a sobering perspective.
Specifically, this literature includes many findings that
show that people rapidly form their opinion when asked
to make a judgment (e.g., Baron, 2008; Gigerenzer &
Gassmaier, 2011; Kahneman, 2011). Furthermore, an
abundance of findings show that once people have formed
an opinion, they are unlikely to change that opinion, as
they will only tend to seek further evidence to support that
opinion (e.g., Bruner & Potter, 1964; Edwards & Smith,
1996; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Accordingly, the
fact that there is no difference in the accuracy of diffi-
cult choices made after distraction or deliberation is natu-
rally explained by assuming that participants have already
made up their minds during the information acquisition
phase of the task and that the ensuing deliberation or dis-
traction phase does not lead them to change their opinion
(see also, Lassiter et al., 2009; Newell & Rakow, 2011).
Rather, participants in the distraction condition may sim-
ply recall their earlier judgment, whereas participants in
the conscious deliberation condition may only search their
memory for confirmatory evidence for their earlier estab-
lished preference.
A last aspect of the data that needs to be explained is
why the published literature includes more studies report-
ing a significant UTA than studies reporting a significant
benefit for conscious deliberation. In keeping with the re-
sults of our meta-analysis, this asymmetry appears to be
due to a publication bias against small sample studies that
found evidence for a conscious thought advantage. We
can conceive of two reasons for this publication bias. The
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first is that the UTA concerns a more newsworthy find-
ing than the finding of a conscious thought advantage, as
distraction is generally thought to have a detrimental ef-
fect on task performance, and, therefore, studies reporting
a beneficial effect of distraction will be considered more
interesting and newsworthy than studies reporting a detri-
mental effect of distraction. A second reason could be
that any small-sample studies—modeled after the origi-
nal, small-sample studies by Dijksterhuis and colleagues
(2004; 2006)—that produced an effect opposite to that of
Dijksterhuis and colleagues are likely to be rejected due
the use of a small sample size. This may be considered the
catch-22 of the publication of a small sample study that
shows a remarkable, but spurious novel effect: Once such
a report is published, researchers will generally adhere to
the methods of the original study in their replication at-
tempts, and this may either lead to a coincidental repli-
cation of the same spurious effect, or to a non-replication
that is much more difficult to publish because it is difficult
to argue against the existence of a published effect on the
basis of a small-sample study (e.g., Frick, 1995).
Aside from a publication bias, another reason for the
asymmetry in available findings could be a confirmation
bias on part of the researchers who believe in the exis-
tence of the UTA. This bias could take different forms
as researchers who believe in a certain theory or phe-
nomenon might engage in various questionable research
practices, such as p-hacking (e.g., collecting data until the
results look the way they should according to one’s fa-
vorite hypothesis; Bakker et al., 2012; Ioannidis, 2005;
Wagenmakers, 2007), selectively reporting one of several
indices of performance (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn,
2011), or running several studies to test the same hypoth-
esis, each time under slightly different conditions, until a
theory-predicted result is found (e.g., Greenwald, Pratka-
nis, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986). Of course, the risk of
these practices is that they are bound to produce a pre-
dicted outcome at some point, if only by mere coinci-
dence.
To conclude, the current study shows that previous find-
ings suggesting the existence of an unconscious thought
advantage in complex decision making concern spurious
effects that were obtained with unreliable methods. Ac-
cordingly, our findings make clear that future research on
the UTA should use more reliable methods, and they also
make clear that the results of previous studies on this effect
should be interpreted with great caution until they have
been replicated in a properly powered study. Until that
day, the idea that a momentary diversion of thought leads
to better decision making than a period of deliberation re-
mains an intriguing but speculative hypothesis that lacks
empirical support.
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